Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief

We propose a rational analysis of children’s false belief reasoning. Our analysis realizes a continuous, evidencedriven transition between two causal Bayesian models of false belief. Both models support prediction and explanation; however, one model is less complex while
the other has greater explanatory resources. Because of this explanatory asymmetry, unexpected outcomes weigh more heavily against the simpler model. We test this account empirically by showing children the standard outcome of the false belief task and a novel “psychic” outcome. As expected, we find children whose explanations and predictions are consistent with each model, and an interaction between prediction and explanation. Critically, we find unexpected outcomes only induce children to move from predictions consistent with the simpler model to those consistent with the more complex one, never the reverse.

http://cocosci.berkeley.edu/Liz/GoodmanetalCogsci06.pdf